Employee Stock Ownership Plans Research Articles

The Benefits and Costs of Employee Stock Ownership Plans in China

ABSTRACTResearch IssueWe investigate the deliberations of controlling shareholders in assessing the trade‐offs between costs and benefits preceding the adoption of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Furthermore, we explore the market responses to ESOP announcements and their associations with the private benefits of control. Moreover, our study delves into the modifications in private benefits of control, changes in employment dynamics, and subsequent operating performance subsequent to the implementation of ESOPs.Research InsightsWe conduct our research employing a comprehensive dataset encompassing the adoptions of ESOPs within publicly listed Chinese companies during the period spanning from 2014 to 2020. Our empirical findings reveal that firms characterized by diminished private benefits of control, as indicated by a reduced wedge between control rights and cash flow rights, as well as a lower frequency of related party transactions, are more inclined to consider the adoption of ESOPs, especially when the potential for productivity gains is substantial. These firms also elicit more positive market reactions upon the announcement of their ESOP initiatives. While ESOPs do lead to heightened productivity, the overall enhancement in operating performance remains relatively modest due to the significant cost burden imposed on shareholders by the large unearned employee compensation. Our results suggest that controlling shareholders who partake in fewer private benefits of control are more inclined to forego these entitlements in favor of embracing ESOPs as a strategic mechanism for realizing productivity gains. However, it is imperative to acknowledge that such gains may be considerably offset by substantial increases in employee compensation expenses. Despite the prevalence of short‐lived features in Chinese practice, we lack substantial evidence supporting their inhibitory effects on the increased monitoring and productivity following ESOP adoption.Academic ImplicationsThis study provides a comprehensive examination of recent ESOPs in the Chinese context, offering insights into the regulatory complexities within the largest emerging market. The research contributes to the existing literature by unveiling the intricate relationship between private benefits of control and the decision to adopt ESOPs, as well as their subsequent implications. Notably, our findings, particularly the observed neutral impact on operating performance, augment the ongoing discourse surrounding the efficacy of ESOPs in augmenting shareholder value.Policy ImplicationsThis research introduces ESOPs as an innovative mechanism for mitigating private benefits of control, particularly in the context of emerging markets where controlling shareholders tend to accrue significant private benefits of control. The incorporation of performance‐related criteria within the ESOP framework serves as a means to effectively manage the additional compensation associated with these plans, thereby enhancing their overall efficacy.

Non-executive employee stock ownership plans and corporate innovation efficiency: Evidence from China

We establish a positive link between non-executive employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and corporate innovation efficiency through a propriety dataset of listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Our findings suggest that the ratio of shares held by non-executive employees is positive towards corporate innovation efficiency. In addition, only the long duration of ESOPs is positively related to innovation efficiency. The positive link is more pronounced among firms with more research and development (R&D) personnel, better-educated employees, and a smaller remuneration gap between executives and non-executive employees. Our findings are robust after mitigating endogeneity issues.

Why do firms adopt employee ownership? An industry perspective

PurposeThis paper offers a new perspective on the potential motivation for the adoption of employee ownership based on market power. Employee ownership may be linked to market power, either through contributing to firm growth that leads to market power or through industry leaders adopting employee ownership as part of rent sharing or a broader consolidation of market position. Both employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) coverage and product market concentration (PMC) have been increasing in the past two decades, providing a good opportunity to see if and how these are related.Design/methodology/approachThe authors predict ESOP adoption and termination using multilevel regressions based on 2002–2012 firm- and industry-level data from the Census Bureau, Compustat and Form 5500 pension datasets.FindingsThe authors find that the top four firms in concentrated industries are more likely to adopt Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), while having an ESOP does not predict entering the top four, apart from firm-level predictors. Tests indicate the first result does not reflect simple rent sharing with employees but instead appears to reflect an effort by firms to consolidate market power through the attraction and retention (or “locking in”) of industry talent. Other positive predictors of ESOPs include company size, being in a high-wage industry and having a defined benefit (DB) pension.Research limitations/implicationsTo better distinguish among hypotheses, it would be helpful to have firm-level data on managerial attitudes, strategies, networks and monopsony measures. Therefore, future research using such data would be highly useful and encouraged.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the potential usefulness of ESOPs in attracting and retaining talent and for the design of nuanced policy to encourage more broadly based sharing of economic rewards.Originality/valueWhile prior research focuses on firm-level predictors of employee ownership, this study uses market concentration and other industry-level variables to predict the use of ESOPs. This study makes a unique contribution, broadening the current thinking on firm motives and environmental conditions predictive of firm ESOP adoption.

Does employee stock ownership plan have monitoring and incentive effects? --An analysis based on the perspective of corporate risk taking

This study uses sample data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2022 and employs methods such as propensity score matching (PSM), difference-in-differences (DID), and instrumental variables (IV) to study the supervisory incentive effect of ESOPs from the perspective of corporate risk-taking. The results indicate that ESOPs significantly increase corporate risk-taking. The specific mechanism is that ESOPs reduce the dual agency costs between shareholders and managers, as well as between managers and employees, thereby alleviating corporate financing constraints and enhancing the level of corporate risk-taking. The enhancement of corporate risk-taking through ESOPs was also found to be of high quality. This is because ESOPs promote R&D investment that benefits the growth of corporate value and also reduce overinvestment and excessive debt that are detrimental to corporate value, thus leading to a higher quality of corporate risk-taking and stronger value effects. In addition, the design differences of ESOPs have different effects on corporate risk-taking: leverage, high discount, longer lock-up and tenure periods, and plans managed by third-party institutions have a stronger promotion effect on corporate risk-taking; employee subscription is more effective than executive subscription in promoting corporate risk-taking; in China, ESOPs do not have a "free-rider" problem, and the larger the proportion of ESOP issuance, the more participants, and the larger the scale of funds, the better the implementation effect.

The Impact of Implementing Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Corporate Performance and Countermeasures of Listed Companies in China

The Impact of Implementing Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Corporate Performance and Countermeasures of Listed Companies in China

Employee ownership in the US: some issues on ESOPs – overcoming the barriers to further development

PurposeThis viewpoint will present some statistical information about employee ownership in the US and interpret and analyze this information in order to address the barriers question using material from qualitative interviews that the authors have conducted over the last ten years with practitioners in the field. There have been few actual empirical studies that sort out the different barriers to employee ownership. The authors have chosen to focus on employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) in the US because this is the principal example from which people could learn from, and the high prevalence of ESOPs plays an important role in the US. This overview will present interpretations of these interviews with conceptual arguments that cannot always be supported with either overwhelming empirical studies or arguments that conclusively eliminate one or other explanation. This is an initial attempt to bring some comprehensive treatment and data to this incipient discussion. This is based on an interpretive analysis of qualitative interviews without quantification or social survey methods used for measurement. The advantage of this approach is that it lays out a completely different level of analysis of the barriers to employee ownership in the US that is “closer to the ground” and more based in the views of front-line practitioners who are actually implementing it.Design/methodology/approachAnalysis and interpretation of qualitative interviews.FindingsThe list of barriers that has been identified is not exhaustive. The preliminary conclusions are that (not necessarily in this order) limitations of investment banking models, poor supportive infrastructure, complexity and cost and regulatory issues, the lack of support by political parties and social movements, the sale of companies due to financial considerations and legal complexities and lack of clarity and resistance by Federal agencies are major barriers in the US. Various sectors of Wall Street has been amenable to employee ownership with the proper government and private sector support. What is needed now is a series of quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews of retiring business owners in closely held companies and of CEOs and CFOs in stock market companies in order to gauge the barriers that they believe are blocking their own action in the employee share ownership area. The Rutgers Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing is working on such a research agenda at this time. In addition, with the future size of the US employee ownership sector at stake, a more intensive one-year interview project would make sense in order to present these different explanations to key actors and practitioners and ask them to provide evidence to prove or disprove the relevance of the different barriers.Research limitations/implicationsEmpirical research which can resolve which barriers are more important than others is presented, when possible; however, studies that provide metrics to compare different barriers are not available and need to be carried out.Practical implicationsOther countries considering employee ownership policies can learn from the US experience. US policymakers and legislators can learn from an original, recent discussion of barriers.Social implicationsIf employee ownership sectors are to be developed, a careful discussion of barriers is most relevant.Originality/valueOriginal document by the authors based on original interviews.

The nonlinear relationship between employee stock ownership plans and firm performance: Evidence from China

Two opposing forces (positive and negative) have been theoretically expounded to explain the relationship between employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and firm performance. However, the direction of this relationship remains a puzzle, especially in countries where state ownership is significant. This paper draws on the “Guidance on the pilot implementation of employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) by listed companies” issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to assess the moderating effect of state ownership on the relationship between ESOPs and firm performance. Using employee and executive stock ownership data from 620 Chinese listed companies between 2014 and 2020, I find an inverted U-shaped relationship between employee stock ownership and firm performance. However, the inverted U-shaped relationship holds only for non-state-owned Chinese firms. Finally, a U-shaped relationship between executive ownership and company performance has been found.

Employee stock ownership plans and within-firm income inequality: evidence from China

Purpose Drawing on bargaining power and the inequality aversion perspective, this study aims to probe employees’ influence on addressing income inequality between top executives and nonexecutive employees. Meanwhile, it examines the moderating role of employee-related factors and plan attributes. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a staggered difference-in-differences design with a propensity scoring match approach and verification of the parallel trend assumption to test the hypotheses. Findings The results support the hypothesis that employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) significantly reduce within-firm income inequality. The negative effect is amplified by both the presence of trade unions and the unemployment rate at the regional level, as well as the duration of the lock-in period and the scale of participants within the stock ownership plan. Practical implications This study has implications for income inequality research and ESOP design and provides theoretical support for policymakers and corporate governance. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature on income inequality by examining the implementation of ESOPs from the employee perspective. Furthermore, it extends the current literature by investigating the strengthening effects of regional factors and ESOP attributes on the relationship between ESOPs and income inequality. The conclusions provide new empirical evidence to promote the effective implementation of ESOPs by combining internal and external factors.

Analysis of the motivation and impact of the implementation of the employee stock ownership plan

Equity incentive can be divided into executive equity incentive (Executive Stock Option) and employee equity incentive (Employee Stock Option). Employees here refer to the intermediate managers, core technical personnel and other employees except for the senior executives of the company. The ESOP is a mechanism by which the employees of the company share the ownership of the company by holding the stock or options of the company. From the perspective of the implementation of the employee stock ownership plan motivation, its main theoretical basis can be divided into three categories, respectively is incentive theory (incentive theory, reduce agent costs, attract, retain quality employees and limited to financing constraints, reduce cash pressure), signal theory (undervalued company more inclined to internal equity incentives, let investors aware that the current company price relative to its internal value deviation) and major shareholders self-interest theory. From the theoretical point of view, this paper discusses the possible motives and results of domestic listed companies to launch the stock ownership plan, in order to provide theoretical support for small and medium investors to rationally understand the employee stock ownership plan, and provide regulatory suggestions to the regulatory authorities to be vigilant about the self-interest behavior of major shareholders.

Happiness or trouble? Employee stock ownership plans and employee well-being in new ventures

Happiness or trouble? Employee stock ownership plans and employee well-being in new ventures

Three models of employee ownership: worker cooperative, EOT and ESOP – overcoming barriers – important choices – pros and cons

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to compare three models of employee ownership and to identify pros and cons in relation to how the models can overcome the barriers. Which choices are important when defining the overall rules around the models and the specific possibilities for variations and combinations and what are the pros and cons for these choices?Design/methodology/approachThe comparison is based on the three main models of employee ownership identified from the country descriptions in this special issue.FindingsThe models do not exclude each other. The models can all be promoted in a specific country, leaving the choice of specific model to the stakeholders involved in the establishment of the employee-owned company. The article also shows the possibility of combining different models and in this way to adjust to specific preferences and conditions – e.g. whether employees and other stakeholders want collective or individual ownership and whether it concerns a start-up or a succession company.Originality/valueThis paper identified the key differences and similarities of different models for employee ownership including pros and cons of worker cooperative vs the Employee Ownership Trust (EOT) and the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) models.

Shareholder litigation and workplace safety

Using the staggered adoption of Universal Demand (UD) laws at the state level that increased the hurdle of shareholder derivative suits as a shock, we find that reduced litigation threat increases workplace injury rates. The effect is more pronounced for treated firms facing higher litigation risk, less product market competition, in low union coverage industries, and with Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Treated firms with high ownership by “dedicated” or local institutional investors are less affected as these investors can monitor safety through voice and exit. Safety inputs fall in treated firms following the adoption of UD laws. Overall, the findings suggest that shareholder litigation threat plays a critical role in workplace safety.

Compassionate Capitalism: Understanding the Juxtaposition of Personal Gain and Concern for Others

This article explores the concept of Compassionate Capitalism, which involves creating sustainable business models benefiting society and employees. Through Compassionate Capitalism, business owners can build trust with their customers and stakeholders, and in turn, enhance their long-term profitability through the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) structure. The article also discusses the historical perspectives on Capitalism and articulates how Capitalism can coexist with compassion. It highlights the ESOP as a present-day example of Compassionate Capitalism, where employees are given a financial stake in the company for which they are employed. ESOPs redistribute ownership to the workforce and create a unique form of Capitalism that continues a successful company’s tradition. The ESOP benefits the younger members of a company, enhances retirement security, and creates a sense of ownership among employees. The article explains how employee ownership can align the interests of workers with those of management, creating a more collaborative, equitable workplace, contributing to greater overall economic growth. This article includes a case study examining a defense contractor's decision to become an employee-owned company through an ESOP transaction in 2010. The ESOP consulting firm, Executive Financial Services (EFS), provided a feasibility analysis and implementation for the transaction. Over the next decade, the company grew rapidly and eventually sold for $1.6 billion in 2020, creating hundreds of millionaires among the ESOP participants. This decision exemplifies the Compassionate Capitalism model, where the owners chose to honor and support the employees who helped build the company, creating generational wealth opportunities for myriad families. The decision to become an employee-owned company through an ESOP transaction shows that Capitalism and compassion can be compatible.

Employee ownership in the USA: lessons to consider in creating more inclusive capitalism

PurposeThis paper aims to identify the key lessons to learn from the US employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)-model. The lessons are, broad-based employee ownership is difficult to attain and sustain if employees have to use their own money to purchase shares. The paper works better when the shares are held in trust rather than being held individually. Broad-based employee ownership improves corporate performance and employee financial security. Employees care more about how employee ownership affects the stability of their jobs and retirement than having governance rights. If laws require democratic governance there will not be widespread employee ownership. Tax incentives are critical to induce companies and their owners to share ownership.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is based on results from National Center for Employee Ownership research, a review of other research in the field, and the author’s own 45 years of experience in this field.FindingsAbout one-quarter of the private sector workforce in the USA participates in some kind of employee ownership plan. There are 6,700 ESOPs in the USA with 14 million participants. The ESOPs hold over $1.4 trillion in assets. About 6,000 of these plans are in non-listed companies and the companies employ about two million people. Public companies ESOPs generally own under 10% of company stock; private company ESOPs usually own at least 30% of the stock and a majority of the plans own 100% of the stock. Most of these companies have between 20 and 500 employees.Originality/valueThe article gives a practitioner's overview over the main reasons behind the success of the ESOP model in the USA.

Effects of employee stock ownership plans on firm performance – evidence from listed commercial banks of Vietnam

This study presents the effect of employee stock ownership plans on the firm performance of joint stock commercial banks in Vietnam. By using the Cobb-Douglas production function model and regression analysis model, combined with the use of financial statement data and Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) issuance reports of 18 banks listed on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchanges from 2015 to 2019, it is found that ESOP had a positive impact on the performance of banks, but there was a lag of about two years. It can be seen that ESOP issuance has a positive effect on the financial ratios of joint stock commercial banks. Especially, the higher the issuance ratio in accordance to the size of a bank, the better the influence on the indices. Though there are many advantages of ESOP compared to traditional bonus programs, only eight joint stock commercial banks in Vietnam have applied ESOP. Banks in particular and businesses in Vietnam in general need to prepare knowledge and resources to expand and promote the true effectiveness of ESOP. From there, some suggestions and recommendations to make the ESOP program really effective for both employees, banks and shareholders will be given.

A Study of the Impact of Executive Power and Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Corporate Cost Stickiness: Evidence from China A-Share Non-Financial Listed Companies

It is of great value to study the stickiness of enterprise cost for reducing enterprise cost and improving enterprise performance. This paper selected all A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to study the impact of executive power and employee stock ownership plans on cost stickiness. The study found that the higher the executive power, the stronger the cost stickiness of the enterprise. By reducing the adjustment costs and optimistic expectations of management and improving the performance sensitivity of executive compensation and quality of information disclosure, an employee stock ownership plan plays a role in suppressing the cost-stickiness effect of executive power. The larger the scale and the more times the employee stock ownership plan is implemented, the stronger the inhibition effect is. An employee stock ownership plan has a stronger inhibiting effect on the cost-stickiness effect of executive power in enterprises with a large proportion of state-owned and institutional shares and high employee status. Combining the research themes of management accounting and financial accounting, this study discusses the economic consequences of ESOP from the perspective of enterprise cost control, which is helpful for internal and external stakeholders of enterprises to understand the characteristics and effects of ESOP in the new era, and also provides new evidence for enterprise cost control while enlightening policy makers and listed companies to explore the feasible mechanism of enterprise cost control from the staff level. It is of great value to study the stickiness of enterprise cost for reducing enterprise cost and improving enterprise performance. This paper selected all A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to study the impact of executive power and an employee stock ownership plan on cost stickiness. It is found that the higher the executive power, the stronger the cost stickiness. An employee stock ownership plan has a stronger inhibiting effect on the cost-stickiness effect of executive power in enterprises with a large proportion of state-owned and institutional shares and high employee status. This study provides new evidence for corporate cost control.

ASPEK PERPAJAKAN TERHADAP PENSION PLAN DAN EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN (ESOP)

The purpose of this research is to analyze the implementation of the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) in several countries and to analyze the taxation aspects of the Pension Plan and Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). This research uses a qualitative approach with data collection techniques through literature study. The results of the study show that the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is a form of incentive given by the company to its employees to become owners of company shares by giving employees the opportunity to buy shares at a certain price and time that has been carried out, which aims to provide rewards, create harmony , as well as increasing motivation and commitment to its employees. Ease in the field of taxation is one of the drivers of increased arrests of share ownership by employees. The United States, British Columbia, Canada and Ireland have specific rules governing relief from the issuance of shares to employees. In Indonesia, there is no tax regulation governing the granting of relief for the issuance of shares to employees. Tax regulations in Indonesia stipulate that in the event that the shares are given free of charge, then when the shares are issued they will be subject to Article 21 Income Tax (PPh) on their market value (in the case of being listed on an Exchange) or their nominal value (in the case of not being issued on a stock exchange). However, since 1999, Indonesia has issued regulations governing the tax treatment of stock options, namely by issuing Surat Edaran Direktur Jenderal Pajak Nomor SE-13/PJ.43/1999.

Confucianism and employee stock ownership plans: Evidence from Chinese listed firms

We investigate whether Confucian culture affects the adoption of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Using data from a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms between 2014 and 2020, we find that Confucianism promotes firms to adopt ESOPs. This effect is concentrated in firms with high human capital intensity, intense industry competition, and less foreign culture influence. Further analysis reveals that stronger Confucian influence leads to longer lock-up periods, more employees holding, larger actual fund size, and more shares per employee for ESOPs. Finally, we suggest that by trigging ESOPs, Confucianism enhances firm value. This study highlights the importance of culture for employee incentives and extends our understanding of ESOP determinants.

Do Employees Have Information on Firm’s Future Performance? Evidence from SEO and ESOP

Using a sample of 576 equity right offerings announced between 2006 and 2015, this study analyzes the wealth effects of the discretionary or no allocation of new shares to Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) and the relationship between ESOP subscription rates and the long-run performance. The major results are as follows. First, for KOSPI firms that have obligation to allocate new shares to ESOP, those that do not allocate new shares have more negative announcement effects and long-run performance than those that do. Similarly, for KOSDAQ firms that have the discretion to allocate new shares to ESOP, those that allocate have less negative announcement effects and long-run performance than those that do not. Second, the significant positive relationship between ESOP subscription rates and long-run performance means that employees have significant information on the firms’ future prospects. Third, news on the large number of shares unsubscribed by ESOP provide negative information to the market. Firms in the top quartile of ESOP subscription rates outperform those in the bottom quartile by 27.54% in the year after purchase. Overall, ESOP members’ decisions regarding allocation and subscription provide valuable information on firm’s future performance.

The Corporation, Democracy, and the Idea of the Bicameral Firm

This article introduces this special issue on the bicameral firm. It lays the groundwork by providing a brief overview of the democratic firm in its historical and political context. The article describes the main problems that large undemocratic corporations pose for society; it contrasts the main ways in which theorists and social movements have sought to democratize the firm—from voice-centric models (such as codetermination) to ownership-centric models (such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans and worker cooperatives); and it outlines the historical ebbs and flows of political movements for enhanced workplace democracy. It is within this context that it is fruitful to consider Isabelle Ferreras's powerful proposal for a bicameral firm. The article concludes by considering the real-world prospects for economic bicameralism and highlights a number of questions that Ferreras's proposal motivates us to consider—questions that are urgent and vital for anyone who cares about the future of democracy.